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e Changing Role of Scientic Experiment
Peeter Müürsepp
Department of International Relations, Tallinn University of Technology
Practical realism is focused on the problem of how science really works. In the case
of physics and chemistry, experiment is the centrepiece of scientic practice. e
rapid development of contemporary natural science does not leave the experiment
unaected. e classical experiment is normally applied only to systems that can
be considered structurally stable, repeatability being the key feature. Aer the in-
troduction of the theoretical basis of irreversibility by Ilya Prigogine the essence of
the experiment changed.e strict requirement of repeatability has to be dropped.
It will be discussed, whether the change is big enough for calling it revolutionary.
ere are means to update the understanding of the experiment by applying the ex-
perimental settings. e material experiment will probably be with us forever but
its position on the scientic landscape will be shied.
Keywords: experiment, non-repeatability, irreversibility, laboratory ctions, Pri-
gogine, Rouse
1. Introduction
It can be considered a well formed position that philosophy of science has
been narrowing itself down for quite a while. It has been theory focused.
Besides, some philosophers of science have been trying to tell the scien-
tists how science should work. In the framework of such intellectual reality,
there is nothing to be surprised of Richard Feynman’s famous dictum that
philosophy of science is as useful to scientists as ornithology is to birds. It
is rather the philosophers of science who are responsible for such attitude
to appear rather than “orthodox” physicists like Feynman. Fortunately to
philosophers it is quite easy to argue with Feynman claiming that ornitho-
logical knowledge has actually worked to the benet of birds at least in two
ways, one real and the other hypothetical. First, the growth of knowledge in
ornithology has enabled to work out more and more eective measures for
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bird protection. Second, the birds themselves should be able to implement
the knowledge produced by ornithologists. ey are not so far, but could
be. It is an analogous situation as with some scientists who are simply un-
able to make sense of philosophy.eir view seems to be just something like
general naïve realism, taking philosophy as a popular generalization of the
results of scientic research.
In the light of the debates like the one just addressed, focusing on how
science actually works, looks a real innovation in the philosophical tradition
of studying science. Still, scientists might claim that they who are actually
engaged in practical research know that better. But again, who knows better,
how the birds actually y, the ornithologists or the birds themselves? Well,
they have dierent knowledge about the issue. One is not necessarily better
than the other.
Obviously, practical realism does not start from an empty spot.ere is
the Marxist understanding of practice. ere is the American pragmatism.
Practical approach to science was clearly attempted byomas Kuhn. It is
the advance of the philosophy of chemistry, however, that has given a real
impetus to the tradition and most importantly added the innovative avour
that was not there before.
e Estonian philosopher of chemistryReinVihalemmhas characterised
practical realism by ve main theses in several papers:
(1) science does not represent the world “as it really is” from a God’s eye
point of view;
(2) the fact that the world is not accessible independently of theories—
or, to be more precise, paradigms (practices)—developed by scien-
tists does not mean that Putnam’s internal realism (or social con-
structivism) is acceptable;
(3) science as a theoretical activity is only one aspect of it (of sciences) as
a practical activity whose main form is scientic experiment which
in its turn takes place in the real world, being a purposeful and crit-
ically theory-guided constructive, manipulative, material interfer-
ence with nature;
(4) science as practice is also a social-historical activity which means,
among other things, that scientic practice includes a normative as-
pect, too, and that means, in its turn, that the world as it is actually
accessible to science is not free from norms either;
(5) though neither naïve nor metaphysical, it is certainly realism as it
claims that what is “given” in the form of scientic practice is an
aspect of the real world. (Vihalemm 2011, 48).
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e theses are mostly not about the experiment. Still, if anyone speaks
about anything practical in science then the rst intuition is normally di-
rected to the experiment. Obviously, the approach is much broader than
that. Practicing science does not necessarily mean experimenting aer all.
e experiment is just one, although a very important, element in science
as a practical activity. However, if we take the stand that there are changes
in practicing science happening over time then experiment most probably
becomes aected as well. But does its essence change? Or if it does, can
the new activity be called experiment any longer? e central claim of the
current paper is that the essence of experiment has changed over the last
decades and its role in natural science today is not the same as it was half a
century ago. is concerns regular laboratory experiments, not necessarily
thought experiments or computer experiments.
2. e Traditional Repeatable Experiment
e traditional material experiment is interference into nature. It disturbs
natural settings. However, it has been believed that experimental justica-
tion of a theory of natural science is absolutely mandatory. Without exper-
imental proof we would be trapped in metaphysics like in the cases where
(classical) experiment in the traditional sense cannot be set up at all as in
the case of studying ethical or religious issues or metaphysics itself.e tra-
ditional material scientic experiment does not just have to be possible but
one has to be able to repeat it. Needless to say, the results should not dif-
fer too much. is is an important, even crucially so, detail. How much is
too much? e answer is vitally important. It will enable us to determine
whether we are dealing with a repeatable experiment or not. Obviously, this
is not the only issuewe can apply for drawing the line. Weneed to analyse the
problem from two dierent methodological points of view. is is because
from the subjective impression formed by human sense experience, strictly
speaking nothing in this world is repeatable. Scientic theories, on the other
hand, have been based on the idea of reversibility that has set the theoretical
basis for the claim of the repeatability of experiments for centuries neglect-
ing the role of the arrow of time altogether. For instance, concerning com-
plex systems, one can state: “While life-less, complex systems are irreversible
because of their complexity and, hence, not repeatable, living systems are
reproduced by irreversible copy-reproduction and by coding.is mode of
reproduction results of necessity in an arrow of time of growth and increas-
ing complexity with death as its antagonist, and in obligatory asymmetry”
(Walker 1983, 806).
Let us take a deeper look into the essence of the repeatability of experi-
ments using a selection of approaches and concepts that are known in phi-
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losophy of science. For instance, the Frenchmathematician and philosopher
Renéom has claimed that all experimental science is based on the con-
ception that experiments will be repeatable, stressing that saying that an ex-
perimental result is “not repeatable” is to suggest that the result is not true,
at least a mistake, and perhaps even a fraud (om 1975). What could be
worse than that for a researcher to hear? e critics say that this attitude
alone has done a lot of harm to contemporary natural science preventing it
from implementing novel research approaches and focuses that could have
worked for a more ecient advancement of science than we have seen so
far. However, this is the topic for the next chapter. On the other hand, the
requirement of repeatability has helped to secure the necessary rigour of sci-
entic research.
What does repeatability really mean? As it was stated above already,
nothing in the empirical world has ever been repeatable in the direct mean-
ing of the word. Even the Holy Bible recognizes that there is nothing new
under the Sun, everything repeats, but in a new way (my emphasis—P.M.).
It has been stressed by Renéom and several others that repeatability de-
pends on whether you can duplicate the initial and surrounding precondi-
tions precisely enough. We cannot expect the results to be the same if the
pre-conditions are not the same. However, the pre-conditions cannot pos-
sibly be the same ever. Everything in the physical world is under constant
change as far as representation of the initial conditions is concerned. It has
mistakenly been believed that progress in building better and better mea-
surement devices will cause this problem to disappear. is is not going to
happen.e problem of initial conditions is not a problem of measurement.
It is rather a problem of representation. We can elaborate the precision of
the preconditions for ever adding newdecimal digits to themeasurement re-
sults as the devices progress. Absolute precision cannot be achieved because
it does not exist in the world that is constructed like ours.
e question, howmuch is enough, or rather howmuch is not toomuch,
meaning the dierence in nal results, will stay with us forever. What is the
measure of repeatability? As a matter of fact, by and large, the answer to this
question is a matter of convention, depending on how high precision are we
looking for. Still, the issue ismore complicated than that. Higher precision in
the initial conditions does not necessarily guarantee the same for the results.
is has been known for at least half a century already (if we do not consider
Henri Poincaré’s calculations in early XX-th century the results of which the
greatmathematician himself was not sure of), aer Edward Lorentz’s famous
computer-based studies of the weather patterns that led to the discovery of
the so-called buttery attractor. It may be that Lorentz had a computer that
did not function properly. Many similar computer based experiments, how-
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ever, have been done aer that.ere is sucient consistency with Lorentz’s
results for claiming that the computer cannot be “blamed” for the discovery
of the buttery eect. It has been proved that there can be wide dierences
in the degree of sensitivity to the inevitable, but sometime negligibly small,
dierences in pre-conditions. Some physical situations as well as some com-
binations of equations are highly susceptible to very small dierences in ini-
tial conditions. Classical science has quite successfully managed to avoid
studying such phenomena. Actually, they were very dicult to deal with
before the age of the computers began. But there is no rational excuse for
that avoidance any more.
It cannot be reasonably denied that there is consistency between the re-
sults of numerous computer simulations run by researchers and behaviour
of the corresponding material structures. ere are many computer simu-
lations of physical processes that play an important role in the development
and understanding of physics-based mathematical models. Some examples
include, i.e. the cylinder deformation application or the reference distribu-
tion variable selection performance of simulated examples of varying com-
plexity, not to speak of the numerousmodels developed in the scope of chaos
theory
Obviously, the computer simulations broaden the scope of understand-
ing of thematerial experiment beyond their regular reach. However, this has
been done at the cost of loosening the link between the calculations done by
the computer andmaterial reality.erefore, even the experiment in physics
is not necessarily embedded inmaterial structures anymore. Computers are
taking over because scientic research has gone beyond the reach of human
sense perception and even imagination based on sense perception.
Again, it is Renéom who has argued that scientists have historically
shied away from all those phenomena that have too great a degree of sensi-
tivity to initial conditions (om 1975).is is true. However, it is not clear
whether om himself was really trying to break through this old attitude
or rather to strengthen it by means of proposing a new exible approach to
t into the traditional framework. Here, we mean the conception or prop-
erty of structural stability.e conception, initially a mathematical one, has
been elaborated by om at length in his Structural Stability and Morpho-
genesis, the French original of which was published in 1972 and translated
into English in 1975. An analysis of the conception can be found in my book
(Müürsepp 2010). A system can be called structurally stable when it does
not change qualitatively under the inuence of small scale uctuations. It
is true that classical science avoids everything that is not structurally stable.
Trying to break through this barrier René om normally still retains the
traditional thinking of a classical scientist. It was Ilya Prigogine who man-
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aged to turn the tables. It is his approach that is the core of the non-classical
view on science including the experiment itself. We shall address the Pri-
goginian ideas in more detail below.
As our analysis belongs to the frames of practical realism, we cannot
avoid referring to the conception of ϕ-science presented by Rein Vihalemm
(2007). By ϕ-scienceVihalemmmeans a theoreticalmodel of science proper.
Physics is denitely the closest discipline to the model but does not coincide
with it.e model is still a model, not any kind of specic branch of science
itself. It is a steadymethodological framework. Each and every branch of sci-
ence changes constantly. According to the model of ϕ-science, it is just the
so-called constructive-hypothetico-deductive type of cognition that can be
the basis of science proper.e researcher constructs the object of research
for herself and does not study directly what nature provides. However, we
cannot say that it is not reality that is being studied. It is a type of reality, the
scientic one. ere is also a good chance that it is not too far from reality
concerning the world out there as the researcher still constructs her object
not neglecting data obtained through sense experience by means of system-
atic observation. But we cannot be sure because we do not possess the God’s
eye. It is more complicated in the cases where we do not have observational
acquaintance.ere additional models have to be brought in.
Obviously, it is more convenient to set up an experiment while studying
a constructed object than a natural one. Actually, this is the only way we can
set up a repeatable experiment at all.us, classical repeatable experiment is
a constructed situation. Science proper can work with such situations only.
Now, we can add another point here. Only structurally stable phenomena
can be studied by ϕ-science. It is just the structurally stable phenomena that
can be tested by means of classical repeatable experimentation.
What about quantum mechanics from the experimental point of view?
Normally, it is considered to be one of the core examples of non-classical
science. It is true, that statistics is present more clearly than in classical sci-
ence and we necessarily have to consider statistical means when speaking
about either initial conditions or results of a process. But repeatability is still
required. Even more so, because the mean of a large number of experimen-
tal results have to be considered in order to be able to draw a conclusion.
e situation studied in quantum mechanics is still an idealized one. e
whole approach is based on reversible theoretical considerations, i.e. the
Schrödinger equation. Actually, we are still in the classical context here. It is
so concerning both theoretical and practical (experimental) considerations.
Still, we cannot deny the fact that quantum theorists (and experimenters)
fully acknowledge the fact that setting up an experiment and applying mea-
surement breaks the natural sequence of events.
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3. Making Sense of the New (Non-Repeatable) Experiment
Classical natural science takes reversibility as an inevitable premise of any
rigorous research. As we noted above, the same is basically true about quan-
tum theory as well. ere is no dierence when we consider the other ag-
pole of the so-called non-classical science, namely relativity theories. e
great Albert Einstein did not consider time to be anything else than an illu-
sion. Why abandon the requirement of repeatability of experiments in the
situation where the scientic scene seems to be in full support of the idea
that the irreversibility of worldly phenomena is just an illusion, a subjective
impression based on the limited capacity of our senses? If time does notmat-
ter, we can repeat everything we need as many times as we like and ne tune
the result. is would not necessarily work in an ever changing irreversible
world.
Before going on with the real non-classical approach that was brought
about by Ilya Prigogine and Hermann Haken we have to pay a tribute to an
exceptional thinker of late XIX-th early XX-th century.is is Ludwig Boltz-
mann who was on the right track while trying to introduce the evolutionary
approach into physics. His main ideas necessarily involved the conception
of irreversibility. Here is the moment in the history of science where the
concept of the arrow of time nds its true place. Unfortunately, Boltzmann
backed o aer coming under severe criticism of opponents. It seems he
never regained his mental stability aer this debate. Boltzmann’s theoretical
considerations directly lead to the idea of the non-repeatable experiment.
He was very close to getting there.
Boltzmann’s main problem concerns directly a principle that has a close
connection to experimental research undertaken in the XX-th century by
Bénard, Belousov and Zhabotinsky, etc., namely the second law of thermo-
dynamics. Boltzmann interpreted the second law as a practical, rather than
a theoretical principle. He tried to introduce irreversibility into dynamics
but failed to extend it into thermodynamics.
Boltzmann got trapped into a dramatic situation. He started to believe
that in order to understand nature we have to include evolutionary features
and that irreversibility, as dened by the second law of thermodynamics, was
decisive here (Prigogine 1997, 21). But Boltzmann was also heir to the tradi-
tion of classical dynamics. He realized that giving a microscopic meaning to
the arrow of time is crucial. Boltzmann had to choose between the idea that
physics had to understand becoming and his belief in the traditional role of
dynamics. e attempt of Boltzmann to introduce irreversibility on the ba-
sis of trajectories was hopeless as we know today. “As Henri Poincaré noted,
explaining irreversibility in terms of trajectories that are time-reversible pro-
cesses, however numerous, appears to be a purely logical error” (Prigogine
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1997, 21). Boltzmann’s interpretation was probability-based. He managed to
make the macroscopic character of our sense observations responsible for
the irreversibility that we observe.us, irreversibility remained not a basic
law of nature but merely a consequence of the approximate character of our
observations.e revolution was postponed.
Eventually, the revolution was made possible by Ilya Prigogine. For Pri-
gogine irreversibility becomes a fundamental theoretical fact. He postulated
the second law of thermodynamics as a principle of selection leading to the
breaking of time symmetry (Näpinen and Müürsepp 2002, 467). e new
physical and mathematical concepts had to be created just for this reason.
e breaking of time symmetry is an inner quality explained by the time
operator. anks to the introduction of the operator it is possible to ex-
plain the inner breaking of time symmetry simultaneously in mechanics,
quantum physics and relativity theories. e word ‘inner’ means that the
breaking of time symmetry is not forced by new interactions (Näpinen and
Müürsepp 2002, 467). e time operator is closely connected to the micro-
scopic entropy operator. rough non-canonical transformations the evo-
lution operator is reached (Näpinen and Müürsepp 2002, 468). is is the
chain of novelties that leads to the physical-mathematical description with
unidimesional time owing from the past into the future. ere are still
thinkers who believe that some events are evolving in one direction only be-
cause the opposite direction would have a very small probability but is still
possible. e view of Ilya Prigogine is dierent. He considers some states
to be strictly forbidden and not possible to be discovered in nature. us,
irreversibility was made a fundamental property of physics. Time that we
are familiar with from classical physics is just an average over his new time
operator. Prigogine incorporated reversible and irreversible parts into a new
microscopic equation. e equation contains an operator analogous to the
Hamiltonian. is is the time evolution operator that can drive the system
to both equilibrium or nonequilibrium states.
As a matter of fact, Prigogine does not connect the second law of ther-
modynamics just with the experimental situation and thermal machines.
For him, the scope of the law is much broader. e main idea of the sec-
ond law is that there is a quantity in nature that changes in only one direc-
tion. In that case, he believes, there are also states that change in only one
direction.is is a clear novelty of the Prigoginian approach. An analogous
interpretation has been presented by Max Planck.e traditional statistical
interpretation of the second law of thermodynamics allowsmovement in the
opposite direction as well. It just considers its probability very low.us, the
Prigoginian interpretation sets a rm theoretical basis for irreversibility. As
everything is unique in principle, repeatability of the experiment cannot be
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kept as a strict requirement any more. Nothing can forbid us to repeat ex-
periments of course. We just have to keep inmind that the world out there is
irreversible not only in the subjective sense of human sense experience but
in the theoretical objective sense as well.
e researcher can still construct the object but the construction will be
unique. Repetition of experiments may occur but the “reading” of their re-
sults has to change. In order to explain the change in more detail we need
to bring in the attractors. e repeatedly achieved result of an experiment
oen describes a strange attractor. We can never expect to predict where in
the attractor the next result will fall. However, we can be for more or less
sure that it will not be outside of the attractor. Actually, this is the buttery
generalized.ere is repeating but it does notmean that the experiments are
any longer repeatable by their essence. e attractor is a new mathematical
tool. It enables to describe the behaviour of real complex material systems,
like the atmosphere, in a more exible way than the classical tools like mean
and standard deviation. Probably, this exibility does not give an essentially
new material explanation for non-repeatability of experiments. But do we
need that. Perhaps a better mathematical tool enabling more precise de-
scription is all we can have here as we have the Prigoginian interpretation of
the second law of thermodynamics at our disposal already.
Prigogine attempts to have an experimental dialogue with nature rather
than nding anything out once and for all. While applying such approach,
we need to understand that nature normally says “no” and only very seldom
“may be”. Still, nature never lies. ese are the laws of nature that do so be-
cause they are our own creation. How ingenious, is quite an open question.
e lying laws of nature bring us into contact with the thoughts of an in-
uential thinker in philosophy of science today, namely Nancy Cartwright.
Her main point is that the laws of physics lie, because they do not accurately
describe real situations in the world (Cartwright 1983). Cartwright claims
that the physical laws have a ctional character in the sense of literary, the-
atrical or lm ction. Being the laws of physics, however, demands a unique
physical ctive staging.
Nancy Cartwright’s central claim concerning the lying laws has been
challenged by Joseph Rouse for more than once. At rst, Rouse argued that
Cartwright’s arguments challenge the truth of law-statements only if their
meaning were xed in ways at odds with the actual use of such expressions
in scientic practice (Rouse 1987, ch. 5). e literal interpretation of the
laws that Cartwright once took to be false does not express accurately what
the laws really mean in scientic practice. In a more general interpretation
given by Rouse (2008) the experiment appears in a particularly interesting
way. e stories of scientic ction do not necessarily involve experimen-
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tation at all. It is taken for granted as something that is understood well
enough. Philosophers have not been too keen about including experimen-
tation into their sphere of interest. Joseph Rouse is correct emphasizing that
the logical empiricists, for instance, conned experimentation to the context
of justication rather than discovery; post-empiricists and scientic realists
emphasized that experimentation presupposes prior theoretical articulation
of concepts; while reaction to the excesses of both traditions proclaimed that
experimentation has a life of its own apart from developing or testing con-
cepts and theories (Rouse 2008, 3). Rouse pays a lot of attention to thought
experiments in the current context. Our focus, however, will remain with
the laboratory.
If we look into the aim of laboratory science we come to realize that ex-
perimentation in the laboratory probably has to allow new aspects of the
world to show up as conceptually articulable. In the case of classical exper-
imentation this can hardly happen. Here we should rather agree with the
logical empiricists. No discovery is possible. It is rather justication we can
be looking for. e Prigoginian revolution, however, opens the gate for an
ever ongoing experimental dialogue with nature.
In order to understand how new aspects of the world can show up we
could take a look at what Ian Hacking has pointed out about how scientists
come to know their way around in the world: “In nature there is just com-
plexity, whichwe are remarkably able to analyse. We do so by distinguishing,
in themind, numerous dierent laws. We also do so by presenting in the lab-
oratory, pure, isolated phenomena” (Hacking 1983, 226). Obviously, Hacking
is speaking about the classical experiment dealing with isolated phenomena.
But he is still talking about events in the world rather than appearances to
themind. It is interesting that experimental work wasmeant not just to strip
away confounding complexities to reveal underlying nomic simplicity.
Still, what does it mean to open up a scientic domain and how are such
events related to the construction of experimental systems? is is the cen-
tral question Joseph Rouse puts in his account of laboratory ctions (Rouse
2008, 7). e latter term asks for an explanation. ere is nothing strange
about calling thought experiments or theoretical models ctional. But how
can the term relate to themost regular laboratory settings? It is an interesting
question, especially in the light of the revolution concerning irreversibility.
e new type of experimental setting has to be a system consisting of the
experimental apparatus as well as an appropriate setting of the mind of the
researcher. It is not clear, however, whether Rouse includes the researcher
herself into the experimental setting. Rouse speaks of two interconnected
features, that of the experimental systems that bring an entire eld of phe-
nomena “into the open” or “into the space of reason”. First is the systematic
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character of experimental operations. Fictions in this sense are imaginative
constructions that have sucient self-enclosure and internal complexity to
constitute a situation whose relevant features can be identied through their
mutual interrelations. Second, ctions constitute their own “world” (Rouse
2008, 8). It is denitely a big step forward in understanding the experiment
compared to the classical approach based on just dierent experimental in-
stances. Fortunately, it is a quite widely recognized attitude in philosophy
of science already. It stems back to the Polish thinker Ludwik Fleck (1979)
who has also played a big role inuencingomas Kuhn’s conception of the
scientic revolutions.
e idea of intentionality and conceptual character of experimental sys-
tems asks for an analysis of the constitutive character of laboratory ctions.
According to Rouse, the constitution of a scientic domain accounts for the
conceptual character of the distinctions functioning within the associated
eld of scientic work (Rouse 2008, 9). Rouse’s account is close to Nancy
Cartwright’s “blueprints for nomological machines”. Still, Rouse has taken
a step forward not just by trying to avoid the quite inappropriate machine
metaphor but rather by adding conceptually articulable behaviour to just
regular behaviour. e whole language of Cartwright is quite inappropri-
ate and technical considering the generalizing trend of making sense of the
experimental settings. Both Cartwright and Ronald Giere bring in empiri-
cal adequacy or resemblance to “real” systems. Hereby, we agree with Rouse
that this move has beenmade too late.ese characteristics would denitely
work in classical mechanics, in the eld that has set the basis of all modern
science but has to be le behind today as a too rough approximation of em-
pirical reality. Today, it is normal for science to progress into new domains
of phenomena.
Still, what is the real novelty of Rouse’s position in our context of chang-
ing the view on the experiment? Is there a qualitative dierence from the
“classical” views (Cartwright, Giere, etc) or is it just a mastery elaboration?
Unfortunately, it seems to be rather the latter that is true. Rouse speaks about
parallel development of practical and verbal articulation as well as devel-
opment and renement of instruments (Rouse 2008, 13). is is useful of
course. But it can hardly give us a new understanding of the experiment.
But the general trend is still very promising. Looking intoHasokChang’s
(2004, 59–60) considerations on measurement supports the idea. Chang
calls the case “the problem of nomicmeasurement”.is is when we identify
a concept X by some other phenomenonY. It is interesting that the issue does
not apply only to quantitative measurement. First of all it is a problem of the
projection of the concept to be right or wrong. Such type of measurement
aects non-quantitative concepts as much as it applies to measurable quan-
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tities. Here we probably have an elaboration of what Henri Poincaré and
Renéom were suggesting while endorsing the qualitative approach over
the quantitative one.e experimental studies of Prigogine are clearly con-
sistent with these ideas. Research into the nature of the so-called dissipative
structures can be made quantitative as far as the results are concerned. Such
numerical results, however, would not make any sense whatsoever without
qualitative explanations. Sometimes they support the qualitative interpreta-
tion. Sometimes it is just the qualitative pattern we can reasonably be inter-
ested in.
Aer all, it is not just Prigogine, orom or Poincaré. It is not true that
it is always the qualitative result that we are aiming at? Even if it has a purely
quantitative empirical value it is still the interpretation that stems from it that
we are really interested in. If an athlete is doing high jump it is not just the
result itself she achieves that interests us. We are rather interested whether
anyone jumped higher at that particular competition and whether the result
is unique in some respect, a world record or perhaps just the personal best.
Needless to say, we oen still need the quantitative value in order to be able
to give the qualitative interpretation. Interestingly enough, the opposite can
be the case as well. Many physical phenomena turn out to depend on the
qualitative properties of the laws that control or describe them. is means
that the same basic eventsmay occur over a large variety of quantitative data.
e events occurring cannot be exactly the same of course but this is not
needed from the perspective of the qualitative approach.
Laying the stress on the qualitative side of research contributes to the
survival of the experiment. Both can be OK, having just one result and giv-
ing it qualitative interpretation or repeating the experiment with diverging
results that describe a strange attractor.
4. e Maxwellian Revolution
We have explained the Prigoginian revolution. It has a direct impact on the
experimental situation in science. Prigogine aims at a constant experimental
dialogue with nature adhering to the arrow of time that makes the material
experiment non-repeatable by denition.
Let us now take a brief look at theMaxwellian revolution.is isNicholas
Maxwell whose ideas we are going to address, not James Clerk. Nicholas
Maxwell advocates the switch from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry
(Maxwell 2010). is is a call for redenition of the essence of science that
cannot leave the role of the experiment unaected. Maxwell has declared
the scientic reality based on physical research alone too narrow. His idea is
making the social sciences and humanities the real foundation of scientic
inquiry, shiing its aim at wisdom rather than knowledge. is is really a
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revolutionary view as it implies the strife for modelling the physical sciences
aer humanities and social sciences. Looks an impossible task and perhaps
is that from the point of view of the methodology of classical science. What
Maxwell really means, however, is bringing natural sciences into the con-
text of humanities in the sense that they should serve humanity directly or
at least constantly keep this task in mind. e experiment is never on the
foreground of Maxwell’s approach. However, his philosophy of science can
be understood as a version of practical realism as he clearly acknowledges at
least four of the ve main theses of practical realism (Vihalemm 2011, 57).
In the light of the Maxwellian revolution the role of the experiment in
science becomes relatively marginal. It is entitled to reduce to just one com-
ponent of research into nature and perhaps not the most important one.
However, it will denitely still have its role to play. Knowledge pursuit re-
mains an important stage of the structure of wisdom. At least in chemistry,
one can hardly imagine the pursuit to have any success without the experi-
ment, although probably the new non-repeatable one, at work.
Maxwell has not paid special attention to the experiment.e role of the
latter, however, will necessarily be subjected to change if wisdom-inquiry
becomes implemented. Most valuable knowledge will not be produced by
experimental science any more. Rather the opposite will be the case. e
whole wisdom-inquiry has to be aimed at knowledge that is not based on
experimental natural science any more by denition.
5. Conclusion.e Future of the Experiment
Just like the past of the experiment, although not scientic, the future seems
to be with chemistry. Experimentation became part and parcel of human
culture in the era of alchemy. Still, this was not scientic experimentation
in the modern sense.e latter was started by Galileo who was able to pro-
pose testable hypotheses contrary to the spurious experimentation of the
alchemists where no reasonable hypothesis was present. us, physics be-
came the model of the whole science, the experimental one included.
What is the situation like today? Physics in its classical form has practi-
cally ceased to exist. e experiment in physics has turned into something
quite specic compared to the Galilean era. A large part of physics as fun-
damental science has become nonexperimental in the classical sense. e
measures involved in research simply cannot be reached by human senses
even with the help of amplifying devices like the telescope or microscope.
It is just the mathematical, perhaps partly even metaphysical discipline that
has been le over. Still, there is applied research in physics where the exper-
iment is essential.e future of the experimental science, however, seems to
be with chemistry. If we look at the most typical trends of chemical research
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we see only irreversible processes. Obviously, one can repeat an experiment.
e result will not be the same. But what we can study is whether the process
remains in the limit of the same (strange) attractor.1
In conclusion, both of the following positions can be accepted. One can
claim that there is no basic dierence in how we understand the experiment
today and in the past. Although we cannot repeat it with exactly the same
results, their convergence is enough to make the experiment successful. It
does notmatter, whether we call the supporting structure structural stability
or apply the concept of the strange attractor. e others can say that there
is a big dierence. Not just a practical one but caused by the theoretically
justied irreversibility in the material world out there.
ere are two types of sciences, old and new. e old classical one is
history. erefore, the same applies to repeatable experiments. Today, we
need to live with irreversibility and non-repeatability that bring about un-
certainty. ere seems to be at least some ground for the Maxwellian rev-
olution in place. Natural science is approaching the humanities and social
research at least partly as the result of the changing role of the experiment.
In a more general sense, however, the change is guided by the arrow of time,
the evolutionary approach to both natural and social science.
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